Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

Robert Eisenstaedt v. Sears Roebuck Co. and Otis
Elevator : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
George T. Waddoups; Robert J. Debry & Associates; Attorneys for Appellee.
Bruce R. Gardner; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Eisenstaedt v. Sears Roebuck Co., No. 900135 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2521

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

^OCft^efir

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT EISENSTAEDT,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

;

I
SEARS ROEBUCK CO. and
OTIS ELEVATOR,

]1

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No: 900135-CA
Priority Number:

16

]

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ON THE
VERDICT AND DENIAL OF MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL,
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL PRESIDING
GEORGE T. WADDOUPS
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Respondent
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
BRUCE R. GARNER
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSOM
Attorneys for Appellant
50 South Main Street, #700
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT
841.1.0
Telephone: (801) 531-17 77

«

•

fa V' '

/• « . j ~

s*# i-,,^

^

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT EISENSTAEDT,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs .
I
SEARS ROEBUCK CO. and
OTJS ELEVATOR,

Case No: 900135-CA
Priority Number:

Defendant/Appellant.

16

;

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ON THE
VERDICT AND DENIAL OF MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL,
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL PRESIDING

GEORGE T. WADDOUPS
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Respondent
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT
84107
Telephone:
(801) 262-8915

BRUCE R. GARNER
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER f. NELSOM
Attorneys for Appellant
50 South Main Street, #700
P. O. Box 24 6 5
Salt Lake City, MT
841.10
Telephone:
(801) 531-17 77

PARTIES TO APPEAL
Otis Elevator

Appellant

Robert Eisenstaedt

Respondent

Sears Roebuck Co.

Dismissed Before

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT EISENSTAEDT,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

]
;
)

SEARS ROEBUCK CO. and
OTIS ELEVATOR,

1

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No: 900135-CA
Priority Number:

16

t

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ON THE
VERDICT AND DENIAL OF MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL,
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL PRESIDING
GEORGE T. WADDOUPS
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Respondent
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
BRUCE R. GARNER
RTCHARDS, BRANDT, MILT.FR & NELSnfl
Attorneys for AppeJ Lant
50 South Main Street, #700
F. O. Box 2465
Salt: Lake City, UT
84] 10
Telephone: (801) 531-1777

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY . . . .

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.

Nature of the Case

2

B.

Course of Proceedings

2

C.

Statement of Facts.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

. .

ARGUMENT

14
16

POINT I
THE EVIDENCE A T TRIAL FULLY
SUPPORTED THE DAMAGES VERDICT

16

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE A T TRIAL FULLY
SUPPORTED THE LIABILITY VERDICT

22

POINT III
THIS IS A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
CONCLUSION
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
ADDENDUM

:>[)
JO
32
JJ

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall,
751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct.App. 1988)

15

Bennion v. Legrand Johnson Construction Co.,
701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985)

16

Caldwell v. Fox,
231 N.W.2d 46 (Mich. 1975)

15, 26

Cartwright v. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc.,
593 P.2d 104 (Okla. Ct.App. 1979)

25, 27

EFCO Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin,
17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d""615 (1966)
Hastings Mutual Insurance Co. v. Croydon Homes Corp.,
73 Mich. App." 699, 252 N.W.2d 558 (1977)
Hillier v. Lamborn,
740 P.2d 300 (Utah Ct.App. 1987)
Holmquist v. Volkswagon of America, Inc.,
261 N.W.2d 516 (1977)
Jackson v. Harsco Corp.,
635 P.2d 407 (Colo. Ct.App. 1982)
Maugham v. Maugham,
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct.App. 1989)
Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson,
604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979)

21
.26
14, 17, 29
27
15, 27
29
15, 21, 29

Nelson v. Trujillo,
657 P. 2d 730 (Utah 1982)

:\2

O'Brien v. Rush,
74"4 P. 2d 306 (Utah Ct.App. 1987)

?.')

iv

Pacific Marine Schwabacher v. Hydraswift Corp.,
525 P.2d 615 (Utah 1974)

15, 28

Porco v. Porco,
752 P.2d 365 (Utah Ct.App. 1988)

16

Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd.,
113 N.J. Super. 279, 273 A.2d 606 (1971)

26

Snyderville Transportation Co., Inc. v. Christiansen,
609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980)

21

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Utah .Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) ( j )

1

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(6)

2

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(c)

I

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(a)

15, 29

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4 7(r)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50

18
2

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(5)

1, 2, 17

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(6)

2, 23

v

The plaintiff/respondent, Robert Eisenstaedt, pursuant
to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits
the following Brief.
JURISDICTION
This
pursuant

Court

has

jurisdiction

to

decide

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

this

appeal

This case was

poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 70-2-2(4).

This is an appeal from a final Judgment on the

Verdict and an Order denying Otis's Motion for a New Trial or
Remittitur and Otis's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict or New Trial.

The Judgment and Order are from the Third

Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding.
place on July 17, 18, and 19, 1989.
was docketed on August 27, 1989.

The jury trial took

The Judgment on the Verdict

The Order denying Otis's post-

trial motions was entered on October 23, 1989.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in denying Otis Elevator's

("Otis") Motion for New Trial based on excessive damages undei:
Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?

1

2.

Did the trial court err in denying Otis's Motion

for New Trial based on insufficiency of evidence of

liability

under Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure?
3.

Is this a frivolous appeal?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Rules 50, 59(a)(5), and 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, these rules are reproduced in the Addendum
to this Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A-

Nature of the Case.
This

Eisenstaedt

personal

injury

against Otis

claim

for injuries

was

brought

sustained by

by

Robert

Eisenstaedt

when the Otis elevator at the Sears store in downtown Salt Lake
City closed on his elbows, pinning them against his wheelchair.
Eisenstaedt claimed that Otis was liable for his injuries under
four theories:

1) negligence; 2) breach of implied warranty of

merchantability; 3) breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose; and 4) strict products liability.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
The

plaintiff

initially

filed

Otis and Sears Roebuck Co. ("Sears").
2

his

Complaint

against

Shortly before trial, the

plaintiff dismissed his claims against Sears without prejudice.
The plaintiff went to trial against Otis on the four theories of
liability listed above.

A jury trial was held before Judge Frank

G. Noel on July 17 , 18, and 19, 1989.

The jury returned a

verdict finding that Otis was not negligent, but that Otis was
liable for Eisenstaedt's injuries based on 1) breach of implied
warranty of merchantability; 2) breach of implied warranty of
fitness

for

liability.

a

particular

The

purpose;

jury awarded

and

3)

Eisenstaedt

strict

$17,250

products

in special

damages and $5,000 in general damages.
After trial, the trial court denied Otis's Motion for
New Trial or, in the alternative, for Remittitur on the damages
issue and denied Otis's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict

or,

issues.

Otis appeals the denial of those motions.

C.

in the alternative, New Trial

on the

liability

Statement of Facts.
1.

On April 9, 1986, the Otis elevator at Sears in

downtown Salt Lake closed on Eisenstaedt's elbows, pinning them
against his wheelchair.

(Trial Transcript, hereafter "Tr.," at

30-32, 145).
2.
elbows.
explaining

He

Eisenstaedt immediately complained of pain in his
and

that

his
the

wife

reported

elevator

doors
3

the

incident

closed

too

to Sears,

fast, pinned

Robert's elbows, and did not react when they came in contact with
his elbows3.

(Tr. at 34, 345, 347).
The next day, April 10, 1986, Eisenstaedt saw Dr.

Stream at the Wendover Clinic because of pain in his elbows.
Eisenstaedt saw Dr. Stream three times and was referred to Dr.
Thoen in Salt Lake City for an EMG.
4.

On April 30, 1986, Dr. Thoen performed an EMG on

Eisenstaedt which showed
elbow".

(Tr. at 38, 39).

"mild left tardy ulnar palsy at the

(Tr. at 98, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 9).
5.

Provost.

On
Dr.

April
Provost

30,

1986,

noted

Eisenstaedt

elbow

Eisenstaedt's left arm in a long arm cast.
cast stayed on for three weeks.
6.

Dr.

John

tenderness

and

put

(Tr. at 93-95).

The

(Tr. at 96).

On April 30, 1986, Dr. Provost gave Eisenstaedt

the anti-inflammatory medication Clinoril.
7.

saw

On the night of April

(Tr. at 43, 95).

30, 1986, back home in

Wendover, Eisenstaedt took the Clinoril and testified that he had
an adverse reaction within an hour after taking the medication.
(Tr. at 44).
8.

Eisenstaedt was sent by air ambulance bark t-o sr .

Mark's Hospital.

(Tr. at 45). Eisenstaedt later ieturne'1 *<* ''t .

Maik's Hospital where tests w^?~e run on Eisenstaedtr s heat t .
(Tr. at 46).
4

9-

Eisenstaedt had received no treatment for heart

problems before seeing Dr. Provost,
10.

Eisenstaedt

(Tr. at 67).

testified

that his reaction to the

Clinoril was chest pain, difficulty breathing and nausea.

(Tr.

at 44).
11.
at

St.

Dr. Provost testified, based on heart testing done

Mark's

and

later

doctor

reports

he

reviewed,

Eisenstaedt had less than marginal cardiac function.

that

(Tr. at

279^280).
12.

Portions

of

the

Physician's

Desk

Reference,

acknowledged by Dr. Provost as being authoritatively used and
relied

upon

by

doctors

when

seeking

information

prescription drugs, were admitted into evidence at trial.

about
(Tr.

at 247).
13.

These portions of the Physician's Desk Reference

reported causal relationships between Clinoril and, among others,
the following adverse reactions:

nausea, chest pain and heart

Cailure, especially in patients with marginal cardiac function.
(Tr. at 247-248).
14.

Eisenstaedt

incurred medical bills of $3,7 16.69

for the ambulance, air flight and hospitalization associated with
the Clinoril reaction.

(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 8, Tr. at

368) .
5

15.

From April

30 f

1986 to December

12, 1986, Dr.

Provost continued to treat Eisenstaedt for his left arm problems.
Dr. Provost saw Eisenstaedt at least six times.
107).

(Tr. at 100-

During that time, Dr. Provost referred Eisenstaedt for

four additional EMGs:
Walter Reichert.
16.

three by Dr. Ron Duerksen and one by Dr.

(Tr. at 109, 233, 292).

The medical treatment rendered and recommended by

Dr. Provost for Eisenstaedt was reasonable and necessary for the
treatment and diagnosis of Eisenstaedt's injury.
17.

(Tr. at 246).

From January 1987 to April 1987, Eisenstaedt went

to muscle therapy with Dr. Fishman at the Wendover Clinic, at $54
or $66 a visit.
18.

(Tr. at 51-53).

The treatment received by Eisenstaedt

from Dr.

Fishman at the Wendover Clinic was consistent with Dr. Provost's
recommendations.
19.

(Tr. at 246).

Eisenstaedt incurred medical expenses of $2,160.35

for the EMGs, Dr. Provost, Dr. Stream and the Wendover Clinic.
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 8, Tr. at 366).
20.

While Dr. Duerksen's EMGs showed some difference

in amplitude of the left ulnar nerve, he considered the EMGs
within

normal

limits.

(Tr. at

105, 316,

319,

322).

Dr.

Reichert's EMG was "compatible with ^mild left ulnar compression

6

in cubital tunnel".

(Tr. at 109-110, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit

9)21.

At trial, Dr. Duerksen and Dr. Reichert testified

that an EMG is designed only to evaluate nerve damage.

Even with

a "normal" EMG, a person may sustain injury to the soft tissue,
ligaments and tendons of the arm and experience pain.

(Tr. at

235, 321-322, 328-329).
22.

Don

Vernon,

a

physical

therapist,

performed

detailed electronic strength tests on Eisenstaedt's arms.
at

122-125).

consistent

According

and

to

reliable

Vernon,

these

significant

loss

tests
in

showed

strength

Eisenstaedt's left arm as compared to his right arm.

(Tr.
a
in

(Tr. at

126-128) .
23.

Vernon testified that his strength test results,

while measured differently, did not differ greatly from, nor were
they inconsistent with, Dr. Provost's test results.

(Tr. at 127-

128) .
24.

Vernon explained how the testing is designed to

prevent voluntary manipulation of the results by the patient.
(Tr. at

139).

Based on the results, Vernon testified that

Eisenstaedt gave maximum effort on the tests.
25.
during

testing

(Tr. at 127).

When discussing his injury with his doctors or
to

evaluate

his
7

injury,

Ei.senstaedt

did not

exaggerate his symptoms and gave his best physical effort.

(Tr.

at 348-349).
26.
continuous

Since the accident, Eisenstaedt has experienced

and significant weakness in his left arm.

He is

unable to get around with the aid of crutches as he did before
the accident.

(Tr. at 149).

cart most of the time.

He is confined to his electrical

(Tr. at 149).

He had had pain in his

arm continuously since the accident to the date of trial.
at 58).

(Tr.

Before April 9, 1986, Eisenstaedt had never seen a

doctor or received any treatment for pain, numbness or weakness
in his arms or hands.
27.

(Tr. at 48, 68).

At the time of his injury, Eisenstaedt was working

as the bookkeeper for Deseret Gas and Oil in Wendover, Nevada.
(Tr. at 41). He worked full-time, making $5.60 an hour.

(Tr. at

41).
28.

Eisenstaedt tried to go back to work after the

accident, but had trouble because of the long arm cast and the
weakness in his arm.
29.

(Tr. at 42).

On May 12, 1986, Eisenstaedt was terminated from

Deseret Gas and Oil because he could not do his work with the
long-arm cast and because he was confined to his wheelchair.
(Tr. at 58).

8

30.

In

1988, Eisenstaedt

tried

to

operating a computer for Frontier Enterprises.
He could not do it.

return

to work

(Tr. at 58-59).

(Tr. at 59).

31. Other than that brief attempt to work at Frontier
Enterprises, Eisenstaedt had been unable to work from May 12,
1986 to the date of trial.
32.

(Tr. at 58-59).

Dr. Provost testified that as of Provost's report

of November 27, 1986, over seven months after the accident,
Eisenstaedt was not able to return to work.
33.

(Tr. at 245).

At the time of his injury, Eisenstaedt and his

wife were living in a two bedroom mobile home.
34.
exclusively

The Eisenstaedts lived in a trailer court reserved

for employees of the Stateline Hotel and Casino.

(Tr. at 60).
Line.

(Tr. at 60).

Deseret Gas and Oil was a subsidiary of the State

(Tr. at 60).
35.

As part of the rental agreement, the Eisenstaedts

were forced to move out of the trailer court after Eisenstaedt
was terminated on May 12, 1986.
36.

Thereafter, the Eisenstaedts were forced to sell

their trailer home.
37.

(Tr. at 60).

(Tr. at 60).

Eisenstaedt testified that t. he trailer Imm*.' 'MS!

between $34,000 to $35,000.

The Earnest Money Sales Agreement

9

puts the purchase price, with improvement costs testified to, at
over $32,500.
38.

(Tr. at 61, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 4 and 5 ) .
Eisenstaedt

eventually

sold

under pressure, for approximately $26,000.
39.
plaintiff.

Otis manufactured

trailer

home,

(Tr. at 62).

the elevator which injured the

(Tr. at 159).
40.

Otis installed and sold that elevator to Sears in

November, 1984.
41.
and

the

service

(Tr. at 159-161).

On March 1, 1985, Otis entered into a maintenance
contract

wjth

Sears,

under

which

Otis

provided

exclusive maintenance and repair service for that elevator.
at 161).

(Tr.

The maintenance and service contract was in effect on

April 9, 1986, when the plaintiff was injured.
42.

(Tr. at 161).

No company other than Otis serviced the elevator

between the time it was installed and April 9, 1986.

(Tr. at

164) .
43.
elevator

show

The

maintenance

and

that no substantial

service

changes

records

on

the

or alterations

were

made in the elevator from the date of its installation until the
date of the plaintiff's injury.
44.

(Tr. at 195-197).

Any substantial changes, alt-orations <M~ repaid <*t

the elevator, from the date of installation to the date of the
plaintiff's injury, would have been made by Otis.
10

(Tr. at 197).

45*

At the time of the accident, the elevator had a

"dwell time" of 8.6 seconds.

(Tr. at 187-189).

This means that

once the elevator doors open, they should remain open for 8.6
seconds before they begin closing.
46.

Charles

Schott,

(Tr. at 180, 188).

Otis's

maintenance

supervisor,

testified that this is a very long dwell time compared to other
elevators,

the

seconds.

(Tr.

understanding

average
at

dwell

180).

This

of

was

which

is

consistent

two
with

or

three

Schott's

that this elevator was restricted to accommodate

handicapped individuals.
47.
transport

time

(Tr. at 185).

The ordinary purpose of an elevator is to safely

passengers

form one floor of a building

to another.

(Tr. at 173).
48.

At

the

time

of

the

accident,

despite

the

8.6

second dwell time, the elevator doors closed almost immediately,
Eisenstaedt
opened.

testified

two

or

three

seconds,

after

they

had

(Tr. at 31, 145, 345).
49.

Schott testified that such an occurrence would be

a malfunction of the elevator.

(Tr. at 190-191):

Q:

If an elevator door closes in less
than what the adius ted dwell time
for that mechanism is, would you
consider that a malfunction?

A:

That could be a malfunction.

11

50.

Q:

In your opinion, would
malfunction?

A:

I believe it would be, yes, sir.

At

the

time

of

the

that be a

accident, the elevator

equipped with a balance bridge detection device
Essentially,

this

is

a

reactive

field

extending

was

(Tr. at 167).
two

to

four

inches out from the edge of both elevator doors, running from the
bottom of the elevator doors to approximately a foot- and one-half
from the top. (Tr. at 169).
51.

The balance bridge

reverse the closing cycle of

is designed

to

automatically

the elevator doors

and open the

doors when any object interrupts the field by coming within two
to four inches of either door.
52.

(Tr. at 169-170).

At the time of Eisenstaedt's injury, the elevator

doors did not open when they came in contact with Eisenstaedt,
but continued closing on his elbows until his wife pushed the
button on the side of the elevator.
53.

(Tr. at 32, 33, 145, 345).

Schott testified that such an occurrence would be

a malfunction of the elevator.

(Tr. at 171-172):

Q:

You'J 1 agree,
won't
you, Mr.
Schott, that if that elevator door
closes on ? passenger, cunes in
contact with Hint passenger nnrl
does not oppn until that button is
pushed, that would
rppresent a
malfunction in that device?

A:

I would have to agree.
12

Q:

Let's put these facts out to you,
all right?
While I believe there
have been some small discrepancies
in some of the testimony, I believe
it's pretty consistent that the
elevator
doors
closed
on Mr.
Eisenstaedt and came in contact
with his elbows.
And she [sic]
did not react until she hit the
button,
and
at that
time
it
reversed.
And for a period of
time, those elevator doors were
closed
on
Mr.
Eisenstaedt's
elbows.
Based on that testimony, and if
that is what happened, according to
their
testimony,
would
that
represent a malfunction in the
elevator on that- day?

A:
54.
there

are

If that did indeed, happen, that
would represent a malfunction.

David Joseph, an Otis repairman, testified

times

when

a customer

makes

a

complaint

that

about

an

elevator door, Joseph goes out to check the elevator door, and it
functions properly.
55.

(Tr. at 333).

Malfunctioning

of

the

elevator

is

intended result of Otis as the elevator manufacturer.
172) .

13

not

the

(Tr. at

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I
The
verdict.

evidence

at

trial

fully

supported

the

damages

A jury verdict should stand unless it is so excessive

as to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate
passion, prejudice, or corruption.
300,

305

(Utah

Eisenstaedts

Ct.App.

and

Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d

1987).

Robert's

The

doctors

trial

and

testimony

therapists

of

the

established

medical expenses of between $2,160 and over $5,800; lost wages
from $5,400 to over $30,000; loss on the sale of Eisenstaedt' s
mobile home of around $6,000; and general damages for continuous
pain, loss of ability to walk with crutches and other general
loss

of

enjoyment

of

life.

The

jury verdict

of

$17,250

in

special damages and $5,000 in general damages was well within,
and fully supported by, the evidence presented.
Point II
The evidence
verdict.

at

trial

fully

supported

the

liability

Breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and

fitness for a particular purpose and strict products liability do
not require evidence of negligence.
how

the

elevator

malfunctioned.

functioned

on April

These claims are l>as^<l nn
9,

1986.

The

elevator

The malfunctions were supported by the unrebutte'l
14

eye-witness testimony of Robert and Carol Eisenstaedt and Robert
Schott, Otis's maintenance supervisor.
the accident

happened

elevator malfunctioned.

as witnessed

Schott testified that if
by the Eisenstaedts, the

The jury believed the Eisenstaedts.

It

is within the province of the jury to infer the existence of a
defective condition from the circumstantial evidence presented by
a malfunction alone.
defect must be proven.
1975).

Whether

There is no requirement that an actual
Caldwell v. Fox, 231 N.W.2d 46 (Mich.

a product

is defective

is a jury question.

Jackson v. Harsco Corp., 653 P.2d 407, 409 (Colo. Ct.App. 1982).
Whether implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a
particular purpose are breached is a question of fact for the
jury.

Pacific Marine Schwabacher v. Hydraswift Corp., 525 P.2d

615 (Utah 1974).

The liability verdict is supported by competent

evidence and should not be disturbed on appeal.

Mel Hardman

Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979).
Point III
This is a frivolous appeal by Otis.

Rule 33(a) of the

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides for an award of single
or double costs, pLus attornpy fees, fou n frivolous app^oI
frivolous
basts.
(Utah

appeal

is one without

reasonable

legal or

A

factual

Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2H 1157
Ct.App.

1980).

It

is

an
15

appeal

with

no

reasonable

likelihood of success, which results in the delay of a proper
judgment,

Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d

That's what this appeal isare pure jury questions.

365

(Utah Ct.App.

1988).

These liability and damages issues

No legal issues are raised on appeal.

The trial court's denials of Otis's motions for directed verdict,
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and new trial, coupJed with
the strict standard of review on these factual questions, make
this a frivolous appeal.

Otis has no reasonable likelihood of

success and this appeal delays a proper judgment.

Double costs

and attorney fees are appropriate.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL FULLY
SUPPORTED THE DAMAGES VERDICT
Otis's first issue on appeal is that the trial court
improperly denied a new trial because the damages awarded to the
plaintiff were excessive and given under the influence of passion
or

prejudice

and/or

damages verdict.

1078

standard

(Utah
of

of

evidence

to

justify

the

The appellate standard of review is important.

In Bennion
P.2d

insufficiency

v.

1985),

appellate

Leqrand
the

Utah

review

of

Johnson
Supreme
a trial

Construction
Court
court's

motion of new trial based on excessive damages:
16

Co., 7 01

explained
denial

the
of a

A reviewing court will defer to a jury's
damage award unless the award indicates that
the
jury disregarded competent evidence
(citations omitted); or that the award is so
excessive beyond rational justification as to
indicate the effect of improper factors in
the determination (citations omitted); or
that "it clearly appears that the award was
rendered
under
[a]
misunderstanding."
(citation omitted).
To justify a new trial for excessive damages
under Rule 59(a)(5), Utah R.Civ.P., the
damage award must be more than generous; it
must be clearly excessive of any rational
view of the evidence. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1084.
This Court recently stated:
A jury verdict should stand unless it is "so
excessive
as to be shocking
to one's
conscience and to clearly indicate passion,
prejudice, or corruption".
Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 305, (Utah Ct.App. 1987).
The $17,250 special damage amount awarded by the jury
was

not excessive

presented

at

and can be traced directly

trial.

There

undisputed medical expenses.
at 366).
most

approximately

$2,160

in

(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 8, Tr.

There were over $3,700 in disputed medical expenses,

concerning

plaintiff

were

to the evidence

treatment

presented

learned

for

the

Clinoril

treatise evidence

reaction.

The

that those bills

were causally related to the Clinoril prescribed by Dr. Provost
for injuries caused by the elevator.
17

(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit

0, Tr. at 247, 248, 368).
documentary

evidence

Eisenstaedt testified and presented

supporting

the

loss

of

over

$6,000

for

having to sell his mobile home when his employment at Deseret Gas
and Oil was terminated.
Tr. at 60-61).

(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits

4 and 5,

The plaintiff and Dr. Provost testified to full-

time lost wages of $5*60 an hour for a minimum of seven months to
a maximum

of

over

3 years.

(Tr. at 41, 58-59,

245).

That

computes to minimum lost wages of over $5,400 and a maximum of
over $30,000, depending on the testimony of Dr. Provost and/or
Robert Eisenstaedt.
Based
verdict

on

(Tr. at 367).
that

is reasonable

Apparently,

the

jury

evidence,

the

$17,250

special

damage

and well within the evidence

presented.

awarded

$5,860

Eisenstaedt

the

full

in

medical expenses; the $6,000 lost in the sale of the mobile home;
and

the

minimum

$5,400

lost

wage

figure.

That

would

total

$17,260, ten dollars off the jury's special damages verdict.
As for the $5,000 general damage verdict, it's tough
Cor Otis

to ax'gue that such an amount

flamed by the jury's excessive sympathy.

js an exorbitant

award

In fact, when the jury

first returned with its verdict, it awarded no general damages Lu
Eisenstaedt.

(Tr. at 395, R. 23?).

counsel objected

At that time, eisenstaedt'^

to that verdict under Rule 47(r) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure and requested
18

that the judge send Uv j

jury out to determine the appropriate amount of general damages.
(Tr. at 395-96).

After deliberating for approximately forty-five

minutes,

the

jury

returned

with

verdict.

(Tr. at 399, R. 232).

its

$5f000

general

damage

There was no excessive sympathy

for Eisenstaedt.
Otis

also

claims

that

the

"uniformly against Mr. Eisenstaedt."
That is not what the jury heard.

medical

evidence

was

(Appellant's Brief, p. 8 ) .

As specifically set out in the

Statement of Facts section, with record references that will not
be restated
complained
treatment

here, the

jury heard

of

pain

immediately

the

next

day.

He

the

after

the

accident

Eisenstaedt
and

treated with Dr. Stream

referred to Dr. Thoen for an EMG.

sought
and was

Dr. Thoen's EMG showed "mild

left tardy ulnar palsy at the elbow."
to Dr. Provost.

following:

Eisenstaedt was referred

Dr. Provost explained the treatment he rendered

to and recommended

for Eisenstaedt, including placing him in a

long arm cast for three weeks to immobilize the injured arm.

The

jury heard about the other EMG tests run by Dr. Duerksen and Dr.
Reichert, all of which Dr. Provost testified were reasonable and
necessary.

Dr. Reichert's EMG was

ulnar compression in the cubital
Vernon

testified

Eisenstaedt.

about
Vernon

the

"compatible with mild

tunnel."

strength

testified
19

that

left

Dr. Provost and Don

tests
his

administered
tests

were

to
not

inconsistent with Dr. Provost's, just measured differently, and
that there was definite decrease

in strength

left arm.

to his treatment and therapy

Eisenstaedt testified

with Dr. Stream
Provost

and

testified

recommendations.
causal

Eisenstaedt's

Dr. Fishman at the Wendover Clinic.
that

The

relationship

in

treatment

jury

heard

between

was

Eisenstaedt

consistent

with

his

evidence

about

the

medical

Clinoril
within

and
one

Dr.

the
hour

adverse
of

reaction

experienced

by

taking

medication.

Dr. Provost testified that Eisenstaedt was unable to

work for at least seven months because of the injury.

that

The jury

heard Eisenstaedt and his wife testify to the pain and problems
he has gone through since the injury.
Eisenstaedt testified that before April 9, 1986, he had
never seen a doctor or received treatment for pain, weakness or
numbness in his arms or hands.
present no contrary evidence.
and

argues on appeal

(Tr. at 48, 68) .

Otis could

Nevertheless, Otis argued at trial

that Eisenstaedt's medical

problems

"tennis elbow" caused by continued use of crutches.

were

Apparently,

after forty-three years of using crutches, the tennis elbow "alL
of the sudden" caught up with Eisenstaedt the same day as t h^
elevator

accident.

unreasonableness
argument.

of

Eisenstaedt's
that

(Tr. at 388-389).

argument

counsel

pointed

to

jury

the

The jury agreed.
20

in

^ut

MK1

closing

Relying on Lisa Hurtado, the Sears security agent, to
help establish Otis's damages defense reveals the weakness of
that defense.
344).

Hurtado is not a doctor of any kind.

(Tr. at

Until trial, over three years after the accident, she had

never seen or talked to Eisenstaedt.

(Tr. at 344).

nothing

or

about

accident.

his

(Tr.

medical

at

condition

344).

wanted to see his doctor.

She

treatment

acknowledged

She knew
since

that

the

Eisenstaedt

(Tr. at 345).

After hearing all of that evidence, and any contrary
evidence

relied

upon

by

Otis,

the

verdict in favor of Eisenstaedt.

jury

rendered

its

damages

When the matter of damages is

in dispute, it is an issue.upon which the parties are entitled to
a jury trial, as on other disputed issues of fact.

When a jury

determines a question of fact, its verdict will not be disturbed
if

it

is

supported

by

any

competent

evidence.

Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d

913

decision

reached

fact

accorded

due

necessarily

by

a

deference
extends

to

jury
by
a

suffered by the plaintiff.

acting

as

a reviewing
jury's

best

explained

by

Hardman

1979).

finder

is

The
to

be

Such deference

regarding

damayes

Snyderville Transportation Co., Inc.

v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980).
perhaps

(Utah

court.

conclusion

Mel

the

21

Utah

This proposition was

Supreme

Court

in

EFCO

Distributing,

Inc. v. Perrin,

17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d

615

(1966) :
when the parties have had the
opportunity of presenting their evidence and
arguments concerning their dispute to the
jury, the judgment of the jury should be
allowed to swing through a wide arc within
the limits of how reasonable minds might see
the situation; and the Court should not upset
a verdict merely because it may disagree. If
it did so, the right of trial by jury would
be effectively abrogated and the trial may as
well be to the Court in the first place.
The jury decided the damages issue based on competent
and substantial evidence.

The damages verdict was fair and it

should stand.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL FULLY
SUPPORTED THE LIABILITY VERDICT
Otis's second issue on appeal is that the trial court
erred in denying a new trial on the issues of strict products
liability and breach of implied warranty based on insufficiency
of evidence.
a

motion

for

The appellate standard of review for the denial of
a

new

trial

for insufficiency

of evidence is

different than that for the denial of a motion for a new trial
based on excessive damages.

The appropriate standard oJ review

was explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Nelson v. TrujilJo,
657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982):
22

Under Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah R.Civ.P, a
trial court may grant a new trial on the
ground of "[iInsufficiency of the evidence to
justify the verdict . . • . " . . • But when
the issue
is alleged
insufficiency of
evidence, the decisions of this Court have
established a different standard for our
review of the trial court's decisions on
motions for new trial, depending on whether
the court has denied or granted it.
Where the trial court has denied the motion
for new trial, its decision will be sustained
on appeal if there was "an evidentiary basis
for the jury's decision . . , . " The trial
court's denial of a motion for a new trial
will be reversed only if "the evidence to
support the verdict was so compJetely lacking
or so slight and unconvincing as to make the
verdict plain]y unreasonable and unjust."
(citations omitted).
. . , This rule affords maximum latitude to
the discretion of the trial court, which has
heard testimony and other evidence presented
to the jury and is best suited to evaluate
the claim that it is insufficient to justify
the verdict, (emphasis in original).
^d. at 731-32,
In

his

minute

entry

denying

Otis's

motions

trial, Judge Noel concluded:
It is not for the Court to weigh the
evidence nor to substitute its judgment for
that of the jury on factual issues.
The
Court is of the opinion that there was
sufficient evidence on both the liability and
damage issues upon which the jury could bas°
its verdict.
(R. 276).

23

for new

Despite the standard of review and Judge Noel's ruling,
Otis

argues

elevator

that

was

breach of

there

defective

was
or

insufficient

unreasonably

evidence

that

dangerous.

the

Regarding

implied warranty, Otis claims that the elevator was

designed and operated in accordance with the applicable codes and
regulations

and

that

there

was

no

evidence

of

any

failed

inspection or code violation.
Otis

fails to recognize the most convincing

presented to the jury:

evidence

Eye witness testimony of how the elevator

functioned or, more appropriately, malfunctioned, on the day of
the accident.

Eisenstaedt' s and his wife's testimony about how

the elevator closed immediately after opening and did not open
once it hit his elbows, but continued to crush them against the
wheelchair,

was

unrebutted.

Otis's

statement

that

the

only

evidence supporting verdicts on the breach of warranty and strict
liability came from Eisenstaedt is wrong.
maintenance

supervisor,

when

presented

Charles Schott, Otis's
with

the

facts

of

the

accident, testified that if that is how the elevator functioned,
it malfunctioned.

(Tr. at 171-172, 190-191).

Schott testified

as an expert.
Strict

products

liability

and

breach

of

implied

warranty theories do not require a showing of negligence.

In

fact, the jury found that Otis was not negligent in this case.
24

(Tr. at 393, R. 230).

That shows that the jury understood the

issues presented in the instructions.
and hurt somebody.

The elevator malfunctioned

It was not fit for the ordinary purposes for

which an elevator is intended.

Schott acknowledged that purpose

is to safely transport passengers from one level of the building
to another.

(Tr. at 173). The jury found that the elevator was

not fit for that ordinary purpose-

(Tr. at 394, R. 231). There

was evidence that this elevator was specifically intended to
transport handicapped persons,

(Tr. at 185).

The jury also

found that it was not fit for that particular purpose.
394, R. 231).
established.

(Tr. at

The elements of strict products liability were
Otis manufactured the elevator.

(Tr, at 159).

There was no substantial change in the elevator from the time of
its installation to the date of the accident.

(Tr. at 195-197).

Otis took no exceptions to the jury instructions which were
submitted regarding the strict products liability and implied
warranty theories.

(Tr. at 392-93).

Verdicts should not be

interfered with by an appellate court if the issues have been
fairly

submitted

to

the

jury

Cartwright v. Atlas Chemical

under

proper

instructions.

Industries, Inc., 593 P.2d

104

(Okla. Ct.App. 1979) .
Although

Schott f s

testimony

established

it,

Eisenstaedt was not obligated to put on expert testimony showing
25

an

actual

defect

in the elevator.

testified about how the elevator
accident.

Otis's

maintenance

Eisenstaedt

and

his

wife

functioned on the day of the

supervisor

testified

occurrences would be malfunctions in the elevator.

that

such

Otis argues

that David Joseph, a repairman, checked the elevator after the
accident

and

it

functioned

properly.

Joseph

acknowledged,

however, that he would receive complaints from customers about an
elevator door malfunctioning, would go to check it, and it would
function properly.

(Tr. at 333).

It is within the province of

the jury to infer the existence of a defective condition from the
circumstantial evidence presented by a malfunction alone.
is no requirement that an actual defect be proven.
the Michigan

Supreme Court

There

As stated by

in Caldwell v. Fox, 231 N.W.2d

46

(Mich. 1975) :
The testimony of Patrick Fox was evidence of
a malfunction in the brake system which was a
cause of the accident.
It is within the
province of the jury to infer the existence
of a defective condition from circumstantial
evidence alone; there is no requirement that
the actual defect need be proven.
(citation
omitted).
TA.

at 51.

See also, Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 113 N.J.

Super. 279, 273 A.2d 606

(1971) ("whenever the fa^ts permit

on

inference that the harmful fvent ensued from some defect (whether
identifiable or not) in the product, the issue of liability is
for the jury"); Hastings MutuaJ
26

Insurance Co. v. Croydon Hom^s

Corp. , 73 Michliability

App. 699, 252 N.W.2d

cases,

circumstantial

a

evidence

demonstrable

defect

behavior

the

of

product

may

without

558

be
a

(1977)

found

("In

defective

specific

showing

. . . the defect may be inferred

product.1'

); Cartwright

product

v.

Atlas

from
of

a

by the
Chemical

Industries, Inc- , 593 P.2d 104 (Okla. Ct.App. 1979); Ho linguist v.
Volkswaqon of America, Inc., 261 N,W.2d 516 (1977),
The

jury was

instructed

that

products

are defective

when they fail to perform in a manner reasonably to be expected
by an ordinary consumer
function.

in light of their nature and intended

(Jury Instruction No. 28 f R. 217).

Schott testified

that malfunctioning of the elevator is not the intended result of
Otis, the elevator manufacturer.

(Tr. at 172).

The jury was

further instructed that a defect is "unreasonably dangerous" if
it

is

dangerous

to

an

extent

beyond

that

which

would

be

contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases or uses it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the
product's characteristics.

(Jury Instruction No. 28, R. 217).

Otis took no exception to these jury instructions.

(Tr. at 392-

93).
Whether

a

product

is

de£e<*ti^e

is

a

inuy quest jf>n

Jackson v. Harsco, Corp., 653 P.2d 407, 409 (Colo. Ct.App. 1982).
In

this

case

the

elements

of

strict
27

products

liability

wei^

established

and properly submitted

to the

jury.

The

jury's

verdict on that issue was supported by the evidence and should
stand.
The

question

of

whether

implied

warranties

of

merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose are breached
is a question of fact for the jury.

Pacific Marine Schwabacher

v. Hydraswift, Corp., 525 P.2d 615 (Utah 1974).

A finding of

breach of implied warranty by the jury does not require a finding
of negligence nor that the elevator was defective.
finding by

the

jury

that the elevator was

not

It requires a
fit for the

ordinary purposes for which it was intended and/or that it was
not fit for the particular purpose for which it was intended.
This jury was so instructed.

(Jury Instruction No. 24f R. 213;

Jury Instruction No. 25, R. 214). The jury found against Otis on
both of those issues.

(Tr. at 394, R. 231). Otis did not object

to the jury instructions on implied warranty.

(Tr. at 392-93).

There was plenty of evidence for the jury to find, as
it

did,

against

liability, breach

Otis
of

on

the

implied

theories

of

strict

products

warranty of merchantability and

breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
For Eisenstaedt to recover his damages, it was only necessary
for the jury to find against Otis on one of these theories.
Under

the

evidence

presented,
28

the

jury

appropriately

found

against Otis on all three.

Because the issues of defect and

breach of implied warranty are jury issues, the verdict will not
be disturbed if supported by any competent evidence.

Mel Hardman

Productions, Inc. v Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979); Hillier
v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300 (Utah Ct.App. 1987).
on

The jury verdict

liability must, therefore, stand and judgment on the verdict

be affirmed.
POINT III
THIS IS A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
Rule

33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure

provides for an award of single or double costs, plus attorney
fees, for a frivolous appeal.
appeal

as one

which results

"with

This Court has defined a frivolous

no reasonable

likelihood

in the delay of a proper judgment."

Maugham, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) .
without reasonable legal or factual basis.
P.2d 306 (Utah Ct.App. 1987).
In

of success, and

denying

Otis's

Maugham v.

It is an appeal

O'Brien v. Rush, 744

This is a frivolous appeal.
motions

for

directed

verdict

on

liability issues, the trial court emphasized that those were fact
issues for the jury.

(Tr. at: 313).

trials after the verdict.
new

Stillr Otis moved f'\r new

Again, in denying Otis's motions for

trial on damages and liability, the trial court

29

indicated

that these were factual issues and that the liability and damages
verdicts were supported by substantial evidence.
Otis now appeals those rulings-

(R. 276).

This appeal is based

entirely on factual issues properly determined by a jury.
makes no argument of legal error in the trial.

Otis

Otis took no

exceptions to jury instructions, made no objections to evidence
improperly

admitted,

and

made

no

argument

of

prejudice

for

refused voir dire questions.
Otis just doesn't like the verdict and doesn't want to
pay, so it appeals on fact issues.
suspect

This appeal is particularly

because of the difficult standard of review Otis must

overcome on these fact issues.

Otis's task is insurmountable in

light of the evidence marshalled by Eisenstaedt to support the
verdict.
Under
frivolous

under

all

of

Rule

these

circumstances,

33(a).

The

appeal

this

has

no

appeal

is

reasonable

likelihood of success and has already delayed a proper judgment
for over one year.

Eisenstaedt should be awarded double costs on

appeal, plus attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
This case is what trials are about.
Otis disagreed on liability and damages.

Eisenstaedt and

A jury decided thos^

liability and damages issues based on the evidence presented by
30

both parties*

The damages verdict was fully supported and well

within the evidence presented on special and general damages.
The liability verdict showed that the jury understood the issues.
They reviewed the maintenance history of the elevator and found
that

Otis

was

malfunctioned

not

and

negligent.

hurt

somebody.

The

Otis's

supervisor acknowledged the malfunctions.
instructed
liability.
The

on breach of

own

however,

maintenance

The jury was properly

implied warranty and strict products

The jury found against Otis on each of those issues.

liability

evidence.

elevator,

and

damages

verdicts

were

supported

by

the

Otis lost fair and square at trial and simply doesn't

want to pay.

Eisenstaedt should be awarded double costs and

attorney fees because this appeal is frivolous.
The jury verdict and post-trial rulings of the trial
court should be affirmed.
DATED this _jC*_Tday of August, 1990.
ROBERT J. DEDRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Respondent
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GEORGE T(J WADDOUPS
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